![]() Two firefighters entered the residence and while they were inside, the house exploded. When she arrived at the scene, she observed no signs of forced entry into the house. The relevant evidence adduced at the jury trial is summarized as follows.Ĭarpentersville police officer Marcia Davis testified that on April 19, 1982, she responded to a dispatch concerning a fire at defendant's residence located at 96 Wren Road, Carpentersville, Illinois. The court below also rejected defendant's subsequent reassertions of this issue made during trial and after trial. The trial court, after concluding that there was no authority holding a defendant incompetent to stand trial solely on the basis of amnesia, found defendant fit to stand trial. At that time, defendant was suffering from a self-inflicted gunshot wound. The only other witness to testify, a police officer who arrived at the shooting scene, stated defendant repeated the name "Tio" several times after being asked who he had shot. Defendant's amnesia could possibly be removed by clinical hypnosis or by administering sodium amytal. ![]() However, Rossiter also testified that defendant was entirely lucid on what his lawyer was trying to do for him, understood the proceedings against him, and could effectively communicate with his counsel and make trial decisions, but could not assist in his defense during the amnesiac period. It was his further opinion that the amnesia would hamper defendant's ability to confer with his counsel, defend himself, and receive a fair trial. Lyle Rossiter, a psychiatrist, called by the defendant, testified that defendant was not able to recount from his own recollection what had occurred on the day of the offenses, April 19, 1982, because defendant was suffering from psychogenic amnesia which, in his opinion, was not fabricated. Prior to trial, defendant requested and was granted a hearing to determine his fitness to stand trial pursuant to section 104-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 ( .1981, ch. It is only necessary to set forth the proceedings below relevant to the issues raised on appeal. 587, 458 N.E.2d 1387, which declared unconstitutional the same subsection of the aggravated arson statute under which defendant was convicted here (3) whether the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was sane when he started the fire so that his convictions for aggravated arson and arson must be reversed and (4) whether defendant's conviction for arson must be vacated if this court affirms his conviction for aggravated arson, as the two offenses are based on the same conduct. 38, par.ĭefendant raises four issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court's finding that defendant's amnesia as to the events on the day of the offenses did not preclude him from effectively establishing the defense of insanity so that he was fit to stand trial, was error (2) whether the defendant's conviction for aggravated arson must be reversed under our decision in People v. ![]() Defendant was remanded to the Department of Corrections for imprisonment after he was found not to be in need of in-patient mental health services by the Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities following the verdict of not guilty of murder by reason of insanity. Defendant was sentenced to a 14-year term of imprisonment for aggravated arson to be served concurrently with a 5-year term of imprisonment imposed for arson. 20-1 (a)), and, following a jury trial, was found not guilty by reason of insanity of murder, and guilty but mentally ill of both aggravated arson and arson. ![]() Schwartz, was charged by indictment with two counts of murder ( .1981, ch. ![]()
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